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Abstract
What factors influence the development of a state’s military strategy? The study of
military strategy has focused primarily on institutional constraints imposed by state apparatuses,
material and ideational changes in military organization, and the sharing of knowledge and
practices through formal alliances. To clarify the determinants of military strategy in a modern
context, I examine two critical variables derived from the literature, namely civil-military
relations and learning processes. Applying these theoretical explanations to the 2014 Crimean
intervention yields insight into the relationship between Russian civil society and its military
establishment, and the methodological systems employed by Russian military planners to reduce
uncertainty about proper strategy selection. The results of the data analysis show that strong
civilian control over the military does not necessarily lead to defensive strategies and that
military planners evaluate both internal and vicarious experiences to formulate new and
improved strategies.
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I. Introduction:
Military strategy occupies a central nexus in the study of international relations. For
centuries, generals, leaders of state, and historians have all sought to understand the practice of
warfare through a careful study of military strategy. Critical insights into strategy have been
among the most prized possessions a nation could acquire, facilitating the continued survival of
the state and perhaps permitting a bid for an empire. The study of military strategy traces back at
least to Sun Tzu, a fifth-century Chinese military general and scholar whose treatise, The Art of
War, canonized the aphorism “all warfare is based on deception.”1 He stressed psychological and
stealth warfare to subdue enemies without fighting them.2 During a period when vast armies of
men would meet on distant fields and engage in ferocious fighting, the use of deception and
disinformation campaigns to degrade the offensive capabilities of opposing forces was a novel
concept. The change in the meaning of strategy over time has been basically one of scope as the
nature of war and the shape of society evolve along political, technical, and economic lines.
The advent of new technologies has enabled theoreticians to build on previous iterations
of military strategy and adapt them to contemporary combat situations. The inclusion of
mechanized forces, such as battle tanks and motorized infantry regiments, into strategic
calculations allowed German General Heinz Guderian to pioneer a new method of warfare. An
attacking force, spearheaded by a dense concentration of armored and motorized infantry
formations, broke through the opponent’s line of defense and dislocated the defenders using
speed and surprise.3 In the early stages of World War Two, Blitzkrieg (“lightning war”) brought
about the swift defeat of the Polish and French armies in just under a year. Technical superiority

1

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translated by S. B. Griffith, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 66.
Ibid., 105.
3 For information on the origins and development of Blitzkrieg warfare consider, Heinz Guderian, Panzer
Leader, Translated by C. Fitzgibbon, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1952).
2
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facilitates unity of command and the pursuit of established objectives, but the ability to use all
forces effectively requires broader strategic considerations relating to the quality and location of
enemy forces.
An examination of military strategies over time demonstrates that the concept is
constantly adapting to changing conditions. Advanced technologies in the realm of information
security, the use of armed civilian proxies, and digitalized propaganda and deception mediums
have provided new context and theory for understanding unconventional warfare. More
specifically, in place of declared wars, strict delineation of military and nonmilitary efforts, and
large conventional forces fighting climactic battles, modern conflict instead features undeclared
wars, hybrid operations combining military and nonmilitary activities, and smaller precisionbased forces. The operationalization of these strategic initiatives allows states to erode the
capabilities of an adversary without risking direct confrontation. Through an analysis of the 2014
Crimean intervention, I contribute to the debate on the interrelation of military and nonmilitary
activities, while addressing the continuing discussion on the feasibility of a hybrid warfare
doctrine. If the methods by which states craft strategies exhibit a noticeable reliance on covert
military means, then the scholarly community may need to revise traditional typologies of
behavior to account for modern approaches. Ultimately, the research in this study will center on
the following question: what factors influence the development of a state’s military strategy?
Russian military operations in the Ukrainian territory of Crimea provide a contemporary
perspective on the strategic imperatives that guide warfighting capability. Because countries
subsist in an environment where internal and external threats to security are both common and
ever-present, the effectiveness of their coercive arms becomes the ultimate measure of power.
The theoretical puzzle thus lies in determining the strategic directives guiding the deployment of
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military capabilities against all adversaries. Through a fusion of traditional forms of military
interference and nonmilitary methods, such as information warfare, the Russian campaign
brought about the first forced transfer of territory in Europe since 1945. Avoiding mass armed
violence and a preemptive response from Western nations further solidifies Russia’s bold move
as an effective strategic calculation. I aim to explore the factors that influence the development
of a state’s military strategy through a systematic examination of the 2014 Crimean case.
I begin by evaluating the relevant literature on military strategy. Organizing scholars’
findings into a single, comprehensible analytical structure is crucial for establishing a solid
logical foundation from which to study continued innovation in military strategy. Possible
explanations for innovation include civil-military relations and strategic threats. A third variable
gathering significant attention in the literature is alliance structures. However, due to the absence
of a binding partnership between Russia and Ukraine with provisions for coordinated military
action, I treat alliance structures as an omitted variable. Scholarly content within the literature
focuses primarily on domestic political attributes, such as regime type, distribution of power
between civilian and military leaders, and internal stability. A separate group of studies examine
state reactions to outside developments, such as wars fought between other states, past battlefield
experiences, and geographical terrain. Scholars propose that successes and failures in previous
conflicts engender an intricate learning process whereby states use past outcomes to formulate
new military strategies. Following this section, I present my research design, including the
operationalization of dependent and independent variables, proposed hypotheses, a discussion of
my research methodology and the case selection, and measurements and sources for data
collection. This research design acts as a gateway to the assessment of collected data and a
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presentation of findings. Finally, I conclude by discussing any limitations to the findings and
possible avenues for future research on military strategy development.
II. Literature Review:
Introduction
Decision-making theories at the individual, domestic, and systemic levels of analysis use
military strategy as a dependent variable, recognizing the centrality of military strategy choice to
policy and politics. A cluster of arguments posits that choices about military strategy are
mediated by domestic institutions; the orientations of political entities4, the relationship between
the citizenry and military organizations in a state5, and the fragility of governing structures6 are
all examined by scholars framing their analyses through state-level factors. Conversely, a
number of studies attempt to locate the causal factors that drive strategy selection through an
investigation of exogenous pressures, such as rivalries and alliances.7 Since much of the
literature arranges state behavior using these two perspectives, they provide the structural
framework for this review.
Domestic Political Situations
A variety of perspectives suggest that the political alignment of governing bodies dictate
decisions about military strategy and force structure. Regime type occupies a central role in the
literature on military behavior with scholars debating whether democratic institutions are a help,

Dan Reiter and Curtis Meek, “Determinants of Military Strategy, 1903-1994: A Quantitative Empirical
Test.” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 2 (1999), 370-372.
5 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars,
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1984).
6 Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, “Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization.” Review
of International Studies 19, no. 4 (1993): 321-347.
7 For information on adversarial influences see Todd Sechser and Elizabeth Saunders, “The Army You Have:
The Determinants of Military Mechanization, 1979-2001.” International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 2 (2010):
486-488. See also, Geoffrey Wallace, “Alliances, Institutional Design, and the Determinants of Military
Strategy.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, no. 2 (2010), 224-243.
4
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a hindrance, or irrelevant when fighting wars.8 Scholars in this tradition have posited at least two
mechanisms linking democratic governance with strategy selection. One strand of research
focuses on democracies and casualty aversion: since voters’ consent is required for democratic
states to go to war, and because those same citizens will be called on to do most of the fighting,
democratic leaders have incentives to create capital-intensive militaries that minimize the
number of soldiers exposed to combat risks.9 If causalities tend to undermine public support for
wars, then the substitution of personnel for heavy ordnance might serve as a firewall between
wartime costs and public discontent.
Concerns over domestic political costs mitigate aggressive military tendencies among
democratic leaders. A study conducted by Reiter and Meek, which represents one the only
systematic quantitative analysis to date of the determinants of national military strategies, finds
that democratic governments are not intrinsically more pacifist than nondemocratic governments,
but rather that democratic leaders are more inclined to adopt maneuver strategies that keep wars
short and relatively bloodless.10 This conclusion resurfaces throughout the literature with
scholars proposing that a democratic leader’s utility is derived in part by their domestic political
fortunes. Factors noted here include those political institutions that hold democratic leaders
accountable to the consent of the people, and the spirit of democracy with its emphasis on the
development of individual rights, responsibility, and initiative.11 When leaders must answer to

8

Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, Democracies at War, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 56. See
also, Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 167.
For more information on warfighting capacities consider, Jason Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior
Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration.” International
Organization 64, no. 1 (2010): 167-192.
9 Jonathan Caverley, “The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam.” International
Security 34, no. 3 (2010): 135-136.
10 Reiter and Meek, “Determinants of Military Strategy,” 381.
11 Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War, 193.
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the will (and anger) of the people, they start only those wars that they are confident they can win
through swift and decisive action.12
A second line of inquiry emphasizes public aversion to the types of missions undertaken
by militaries. Democracies build firepower-intensive, low-manpower militaries to reduce the
number of and exposure to risks of soldiers, but consequently they must rely on higher and less
discriminating levels of violence, a policy that leads to criticism from the polity.13 Once
disapproval levels reach a certain threshold, the government loses its capacity to portray the war
as a necessary cause.14 Therefore, when fighting less mechanized forces, such as insurgencies,
democracies may still prosecute wars using an ill-suited military strategy because the costs
remain low for an individual citizen.15 Both mechanisms identified in the literature imply that
democracies are disproportionately likely to favor heavy investments in advanced equipment, but
while one suggests that democracies place a higher value on keeping wars short and bloodless,
the other notes that risk-averse tendencies displayed by democracies contribute to ineffective
strategy selection. An inability to craft strategies that emphasize insensitivity to friendly
casualties and maximize violence against an opponent limits the effectiveness of democracies in
war. The strong relationship between state and society acts as a constraining force when
formulating strategies that balance political objectives with military conquests.
A third explanation related to domestic institutions concerns the influence of civilmilitary relations on the power and size of military organizations. When civilian control over the
military is weak, the military’s parochial interests—which tend to favor force structures that

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph Siverson, “War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A
Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability.” American Political Science Review 89, no.
4 (1995): 851.
13 Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 19.
14 Ibid., 21-22.
15 Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents,” 169.
12
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emphasize tangible military power and symbolic weaponry—dominate defense policymaking.16
A number of scholars argue that military-dominated governments have incentives to prefer
offensive strategies because they promote the autonomy of the military, enhance the prestige and
self-image of military officers, permit seizure of initiative and reduction of uncertainty, and fit
with essential beliefs about the inevitability of war.17 This literature suggests that states with
strong civilian control are, on average, less prone to adopt provocative military strategies than
states without it. A proclivity for speed and finality in decision-making privileges military
solutions over diplomacy and negotiation.
A final institutional hypothesis deals with the stability of a state’s governing
arrangements. Migdal argues that in the developing world, state structures are fragile and
governments frequently lack legitimacy. Since the population of an unstable state may itself
represent a threat to the government, leaders rely more heavily on military solutions to maintain
domestic order.18 In these cases, militarization does not stem from action-reaction dynamics in
the states system, but from its superior ability to control restive publics relative to a strategy of
mass mobilization. Maintaining firm control over standing armies while eliminating non-state
controlled armies, militias, and gangs enables a state to hold a monopoly over the principal
means of coercion.19 Scholars in this area have also asserted that decision-makers in the
developing world condition military responses based on their cultural ideas about how a military
should act, as well as the perceived political costs of alternatives, such as greater technological

Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman, “Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional
Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity
in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 84-85.
17
Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 47-50. See also Todd Sechser, “Are Soldiers Less War-Prone
Than Statesmen?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 (2004): 762-764.
18 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third
World, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 15.
19 Ibid., 18-19.
16
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innovation.20 These claims suggest that dysfunctional patterns of state formation, specifically
where state-society compacts are more fragmented, may cause very different definitions of
security and thus different levels of military activity.
Assessing Strategic Threats
Significant material and ideational changes in military organization can fundamentally
change the relationship between states and soldiers. The general proposition among scholars is
straightforward: decisions about how to use troops and weapons are based on anticipated threats
and overall security needs.21 Describing states’ threat environments, however, requires a broad
consideration of possible security priorities that they may face. In contrast to alliances, scholars
examine how states make independent judgements about military priorities. A number of studies,
including Reiter and Meek, find no relationship between external security threats and military
strategy choice, but the results of their analyses do show that military decision-makers reduce
levels of uncertainty by relying on past battlefield experiences.22
Placing a greater emphasis on internal learning processes stands in stark contrast to the
notion that the preferences of military decision-makers drive strategy selection. No matter the
strength of the military within a state, this strand of research holds that the parochial interests of
the military do not dictate strategy choice alone. Rather, states are more likely to replicate
strategies that have been used successfully in past military conflicts.23 A tendency to look inward
suggests that historical experience moderates decision-makers’ inclinations about appropriate
strategic conduct. The adoption of offensive force posturing, for example, reflects outcomes of

Wendt and Barnett, “Dependent State Formation,” 328-329.
Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 41-44. See also Sechser and Saunders, “The Army You Have,”
486.
22 Reiter and Meek, “Determinants of Military Strategy,” 383. For a comparative case analysis of internal
learning processes, consider Khong’s Analogies at War (1992).
23 Ibid., 384.
20
21
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similar engagements instead of predilection for organizational expansion and wealth
attainment.24 On balance, the literature holds that when a state fails in war, the lessons derived
from the conflict episode spur innovation in future strategy selection. Similarly, then, victory
must breed continuity and indifference.
Other scholars propose the inclusion of a distinction between internal and external
strategy modeling. For instance, Sechser and Saunders find that decisions about military strategy
reflect not merely the aggregate balance of power, but also rivals’ military force structures. Their
quantitative analysis assessing levels of mechanization (deployment of armored vehicles) shows
that a state will react to an adversary’s military developments by adjusting their own forces.
States that had been militarily defeated by an insurgency presented lower levels of
mechanization than those that had no counterinsurgency losses.25 The vicarious learning variable
reflects whether lessons from the past speak favorably or unfavorably of one particular strategy
in comparison to the other strategies in a historical episode. In this sense, decision-makers
critically evaluate their adversary’s successes and shortcomings to determine the desirability of
mirroring strategic adjustments.
A related argument put forward in the literature suggests that states are more likely to
change their military strategy after an external shock. A comparative analysis of French and
Prussian military strategies demonstrates that the Prussian military abandoned mercenary armies
in favor of professional citizen armies after their defeat (shock) at the hands of the French.26 The
effect of battlefield experience is likely to depend on the nature of the conflict
(counterinsurgency versus conventional), but the literature confirms that states learn from their

24

Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, pgs. 48-50.
Sechser and Saunders, “The Army You Have,” 502-504.
26 Deborah Avant, “From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War.”
International Organization 60, no. 3 (2000): 48-49.
25
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own experiences and those of other states. The salience of past battlefield experiences also may
be mediated by the location of these wars. Specifically, outside interveners may react differently
to battlefield failures than combatants who face conflicts on their own territory.27
A corollary to adjustments in force structures (largely advanced by scholars using realism
to frame their analyses) contends that terrain and relative location play a significant role in
strategy selection. The geographical variables most often cited to influence strategy choice
include contiguity and physical terrain. If a state perceives that it may be fighting a multi-front
war, they are likely to prefer offensive strategies that promise quick defeats of individual foes,
thereby minimizing the amount of time they will be at war on more than one front.28 The type of
terrain is shown to matter as well. Van Creveld finds that some physical environments are more
permitting of certain strategies than others. Specifically, open, flat terrain is more likely to permit
the rapid movement of large armies, whereas mountainous or heavily wooded terrain will be less
permissive.29
The literature also suggests that decisions about military strategy, made within complex
political geographic settings, can be conceptualized as integrated forms of embeddedness. Three
forms of embeddedness: societal, network, and territorial characterize the nature of relational
power. Societal embeddedness refers to the social history of actors, or perhaps more simply their
distinctive and shared attributes.30 Network embeddedness refers to the ties an actor has within a
social network, and territorial embeddedness concerns “the extent to which an actor is ‘anchored’

Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents,” 173.
Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 70.
29 Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present, (New York: Free Press, 1991),
302-304.
30 Colin Flint et al., “Conceptualizing ConflictSpace: Toward a Geography of Relational Power and
Embeddedness in the Analysis of Interstate Conflict.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 99,
no. 5 (2009): 830-831.
27
28
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in particular territories or places.”31 Networks of rivalries between neighboring states coupled
with favorable or unfavorable terrain types facilitate military action. Flint et al., for example,
evaluate geographical features as an instigator for interstate conflict through an in-depth analysis
of the diffusion of World War One. They find that territorial disputes were inseparable from
Great Power competition and therefore the First World War spread as new entrants saw these
issues as causes or opportunities for war.32 By first analyzing contiguity, the relationship of a
state with one or two geographic neighbors is understood, but the subsequent interpretation of
the whole network of states increases the number of nodes, or actors, and the
multidimensionality of the context. Thus, a state’s decision to deploy its military forces in a
specific manner is largely dependent on the actions undertaken by other actors in the system.
Research Gap
The literature surrounding the formation of military strategy points to an interplay
between material and nonmaterial factors (aggregate capabilities and strategic imperatives), but
the cases examined by scholars relate primarily to conventional applications. Sechser and
Saunders evaluate mechanization rates in the context of counterinsurgency campaigns, but they
view adjustments in force structures as reactionary developments.33 States are not actively
seeking out new and improved strategies rather they reformat approaches after being defeated by
a non-state opponent. My research aims to determine whether the existing literature can
effectively explain the selection of unconventional strategies by industrialized states. If Posen’s
conception of military strategy as a means for a state to “‘cause’” security for itself” is correct,
then a comprehensive assessment of the determinants of military strategy must include

Michael Hess, “Spatial Relationships? Towards a Reconceptualization of Embeddedness.” Progress in
Human Geography 28, no. 2 (2004): 177.
32 Flint et al., “Conceptualizing ConflictSpace,” pgs. 831-834.
33
Sechser and Saunders, “The Army You Have,” 502.
31
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nonmilitary factors (use of cyberwarfare, propaganda and deception, paramilitaries, mobilization
of ethnic contingents, etc.) as well.34
III. Research Design:
Introduction
The aim of this study is to assess the following conceptual question: What factors
influence the development of a state’s military strategy? Causal explanations derived from the
literature are principally concerned with the use of conventional military forces in interstate
conflicts and counterinsurgency campaigns, but there is virtually no discussion on the adoption
of unconventional strategies by state actors.35 Scholars must pay greater attention to the primacy
of nonmilitary activities, used in conjunction with traditional military interference, in order to
develop a comprehensive understanding of the means of conducting military operations.36 If the
military is indeed a tool used by states to achieve foreign policy goals, then it is prudent to
examine whether modern iterations of conflict utilize strategies that deviate from pre-existing
conceptions established in the literature. Divergences in state behavior may indicate that strategic
developments are unconventional in the sense that they reside outside of traditional scholarly
understandings of military action.

34

Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 13.
Understandings of conventional warfare postulate the notion of two more or less equally matched
belligerents displaying highly organized armed forces in face-to-face battle. The evaluation of strategy within
Clausewitzian parameters demonstrates that conceptions of “unconventional” or “irregular” warfare require a
high degree of appreciation for the socio-political environment in which conflicts occur. Since all military
engagements have distinctive origins and directions, decision-makers will utilize a particular set of tactics that
enable them to optimize their military position and fulfill desired policy goals. For a useful comparison of
conventional and unconventional strategies see Smith’s “Guerrillas in the Mist” (2003).
36 Barry Posen reintroduces military historian B. H. Liddell Hart’s idea that a state may integrate a broad array
of measures outside of traditional military force into its operational strategy. The anarchic context of
international relations conditions states to preserve their autonomy through any means necessary. For more
information see Posen’s Sources of Military Doctrine (1984).
35
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Defining Military Strategy
Strategy occupies the highest echelon in military planning efforts. At its most basic level,
strategy refers to the general way the military is employed rather than the total quantity of troops
and materiel a state possesses, or the particular political objectives sought through war.37 Carl
von Clausewitz, a nineteenth-century Prussian military observer, usefully points to the
importance of distinguishing between means and ends in thinking about military strategy
specifically and warfare in general. I intend to focus on strategy as a military means rather than
an end, implying that certain military strategies are not inevitably associated with certain
political ends. Avoiding path dependent explanations will allow me to more effectively isolate
strategy as a variable and assess it in light of the case selection. In this study, military strategy
refers to the principles guiding the use of military forces for the overall planning and execution
of armed conflict. Strategy can be distinguished from lower-level activities, such as the focus at
the operational level on individual battles and campaigns, or the tactical level’s attention to the
use of individual soldiers and small troop units.38
Classifying military strategy requires evaluating existing categorization models within
the literature. This is conceptually slippery, as technological context is likely to determine
strongly what is a sensible typology of military strategy. Nevertheless, I rely on the maneuverattrition-punishment classification since past research has shown this distinction to be a
consistent factor in explaining the initiation, duration, and outcome of interstate wars, with
maneuver strategies generally being more successful than the alternatives.39 Under this system,
each category centers on a different overall tendency in the planning and execution of the use of

37Clausewitz,

C.V. On War. New York: E.P. Dalton and Co., LTD., 1940, 128.
Reiter and Meek, “Determinants of Military Strategy,” 364-365.
39 This categorical framework is used by Reiter and Meek in “Determinants of Military Strategy” and by
Wallace in “Alliances, Institutional Design.”
38
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military force. Maneuver strategies, such as the German blitzkrieg of World War Two,
emphasize mobility over brute firepower with a desire to avoid set-piece battles in order to
disrupt the command, control, and communication infrastructure necessary for an adversary to
function effectively. Attrition strategies, often identified with the Western front during World
War One, instead involve meeting opposing forces head-on in either one or a series of
confrontations where the objective is to directly destroy the troops and materiel of an
adversary.40 Punishment strategies differ from the other two in that they include political
components aimed to break the resolve of the opposing state. The intent is to coerce an adversary
into making concessions by confronting them with the prospect of continuing destruction of
population centers and industry.41 Leading examples are the Allied bombing campaigns against
Germany and Japan in World War Two, and the American bombing of North Vietnam in the
Vietnam War. In the latter case, President Lyndon Johnson offered to scale back U.S. bombing
on the condition that North Vietnam, along with the National Liberation Front (NLF), cease and
desist all military activity in South Vietnam.42
As is expected, not all cases involve states with clear-cut strategies for engaging enemies.
Studies using the maneuver-attrition-punishment typology tend to focus exclusively on maneuver
strategies because they emphasize mobility, a key facet of modern engagements. I follow this
trend because including the attrition and punishment strategies requires extensive knowledge of

Wallace, “Alliances, Institutional Design,” 225-226.
The modern study of strategy has not unanimously converged around the maneuver-attrition-punishment
typology. Barry Posen proposes an alternative system that classifies strategies as being offensive, defensive or
deterrent based. Several scholars have argued that the distinction between offensive and defensive strategies is
theoretically flawed and that the whole notion of a balance favoring the offense or defense is nebulous and
indeterminate. Nuclear weapons, for instance, can be used in an offensive and defensive manner thereby
conflating the means and ends of strategy choice. For further criticism see Levy’s “The Offensive/Defensive
Balance of Military Technology” (1984).
42 George Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, (New York: McGrawHill Education, 2002): 165-167.
40
41
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the institutional demands of each category and the material capabilities necessary for their
procurement. There is an inherent risk of oversimplifying the process of strategy selection when
attempting to rationalize state behavior but having a strong point of reference assists with
determining whether certain conflicts reside outside of traditional understandings of warfare. In
terms of measurement, the most practical method is to make an inference based on a state’s force
structure (how much infantry and artillery relative to armor and air), officer attitudes, how much
national defense appears to rely on prepared fortifications, and whether ground forces are airmobile.43 The presence of ground and air-mobile arms indicates an orientation towards
maneuver, while reliance on infantry and artillery fighting from prepared fortifications is a fairly
clear indicator of an attrition strategy. This approach also ensures that the proceeding analysis of
the relationship between strategy and the variables that explain strategy choice accounts for the
core attributes of maneuver (speed and mobility).
Identifying Independent Variables
The first independent variable is civil-military relations. Proponents of the militarism
theory suggest that military officers are, on the whole, more prone to favor policies that are more
aggressive than those preferred by civilians. The militarism hypothesis holds that parochial
motives, socialized values, and sheer familiarity with the instruments of armed coercion create
conditions that may predispose military leaders in favor of using force.44 It implies that strong
civilian control of the military can help avert unnecessary conflicts brought about by hawkish,

43

To reiterate a previous point: wars are multifarious, and the strategies used by states display just as much
variation in their design and execution. Categorizing strategies under generic labels may downplay their
intellectual significance, but it only serves to reinforce the aim of this study to elaborate on the evolving norms
of military decision-making.
44 Eyre and Suchman, “Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons,” 84-85. See Also,
Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 46-50.
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self-interested military establishments.45 In the absence of sufficient civilian checks on military
decision-making, states are more likely to be saddled with antagonistic strategies. Several
scholars succeed in shedding light on the progressive stages of military influence by devising
classificatory schemes. Stepan, for instance, lists prerogatives where the military assumes the
right to exercise control over its own internal governance and to play a role in extra-military
jurisdictions within the state bureaucracy.46 These spheres, where the military has a formal or
informal claim to dominate, include the army’s constitutionally sanctioned role in the political
system; its relationship to the chief executive, the government, and the legislature; and its role in
intelligence, police, state enterprises, and the legal system.47 The application of this system to the
study will assist with determining how substantive behavioral differences between civilian and
military leaders influence the power projections of a state’s armed forces and the formulation of
strategy.
The second variable is learning processes. Scholars proposing learning theories contend
that military decision-makers may, in fact, be uncertain as to which strategies are appropriate.
One means by which military decision-makers reduce uncertainty is to rely on past experiences.
They examine instances from the past that present seemingly analogous decision problems, they
assess the outcomes of certain choices, and they draw lessons as to which choices best meet their
interests. Leng finds that there are two salient components to what policymakers are likely to
learn from one dispute to the next. The first is what he calls "experiential learning"; that is, a
straightforward application of the lessons learned from the outcome of one dispute to the
strategies chosen in subsequent encounters with other adversaries. The second is the propensity
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to view the nature of international conflict and, consequently, appropriate strategies and tactics,
from a realpolitik orientation that stresses the importance of demonstrating power and resolve.48
Attempting to examine how military decision-makers draw lessons from past battlefield
experiences is no simple task because each isolated incident presents its own unique outcomes.
The most prudent method of analysis is to draw comparisons between my case selection and a
previous conflict while controlling for the incorporation of lessons into military strategy. I intend
to use the definitions proposed by Leng to specify how military decision-makers evaluate the
meaning of learning experiences.
Hypotheses
The two hypotheses outlined in this section are intended to gauge the relationship
between military strategy and the factors that influence its formulation. The first hypothesis is as
follows:
H1: States are more likely to adopt maneuver strategies if they exhibit weak civilian control over
the military.
A key theoretical perspective guiding scholars’ analyses of civil-military relations is that
militaries pursue strategies that serve their organizational concerns. On balance, the maneuverattrition-punishment approach would predict that militaries ought to have an institutional interest
in maneuver strategies. Predicated upon permitting fast decisions on the battlefield, maneuver
strategies require more decision-making autonomy. They require investments in advanced
equipment, such as tanks, aircraft, and communication networks, providing the military with a
justifiable need for increased size and budgets. Maneuver strategies are also consistent with
important elements of most military organizational cultures, as they promise to minimize the loss
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of life for the maneuvering force, facilitate the seizure of initiative, and deliver a quick and
decisive victory.49 Therefore, the strategic preferences of the military are more likely to be
reflected in policy when there is a military junta running the government, or when the military
has a strong influence on foreign policy decision-making.
The second independent variable assesses internal and external learning processes,
stemming from the general proposition that militaries are more likely to adopt strategies from
prior conflicts. The resulting hypothesis holds that:
H2: States are more likely to adopt strategies that were used successfully in recent wars in which
they participated, and less likely to adopt untried strategies.
The literature on learning and strategy selection describes an important distinction
between vicarious and internal experiences. A group of scholars propose that states observe the
experiences of other states in the system, emulating successful strategies and avoiding failed
strategies.50 Others have argued that states are likely to draw lessons only from their own
experiences and not from those of others.51 Both perspectives offer an avenue for further
exploration, but the latter argument promises to provide a more holistic understanding of how a
state adapts their military strategy to changing conditions. The direct involvement of a state’s
armed forces in an interstate conflict or counterinsurgency campaign increases the salience of
that particular engagement because the state will sustain gains and losses from the performance
of its military. Successes in combat may breed continuity and failures may yield a completely
new approach to warfare. Focusing on internal learning processes will also provide greater
insight into the deployment of unique technologies and the sources of their conception. Shifts
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towards mechanization or improved information networks, for example, will necessitate an equal
change in strategic priorities. Having now described the hypotheses tested in this study, the
subsequent section identifies the research approach and data collection methods.
Research Approach
The research presented in this study is framed using a single case study approach as it
allows for an in-depth, multi-faceted understanding of a complex issue in its real-life context. It
is an appropriate means for examining the development of military strategy because each
isolated incident of interstate conflict or counterinsurgency force presents distinctive rationales
for engaging in armed aggression.52 Quantitative analyses produce generalizable results, but they
often use crude measures that are not representative of each state in the sample. Establishing
relevant temporal parameters and coding datasets relating to military strategy remains an area of
focus available to future researchers.53 The application of the aforementioned hypotheses to a
particular case will yield valuable information about the practicality of attempting to measure
military decision-making within a state-societal and systemic framework. From an
epistemological standpoint, this study uses a positivist approach because it focuses on testing and
refining theory on the basis of case study findings.54
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Case Selection
I evaluate military strategy selection through the lens of the 2014 Crimean Crisis. More
specifically, I focus on the strategic initiatives employed by the Russian Federation, the
aggressor in the conflict. This case is important for understanding modern approaches to warfare
because Russia’s forceful annexation of the Ukrainian province of Crimea marked the first
forced transfer of territory to take place in Europe since 1945. The primacy of the information
domain, use of cyberwarfare, propaganda, and deception, especially toward the Russian-speaking
populace in Crimea, engendered widespread discussion about the possibility of Russia
developing a hybrid strategy that it could use to restrain states in its periphery. These
observations make this case hospitable for testing by implying that a state may use nonmilitary
elements together with traditional forms of military action to create strategic initiatives.
Analyzing this case promises to add a new dimension to the literature on military decisionmaking, which primarily centers on the application of military means to interstate conflict and
counterinsurgency campaigns.
Data Sources and Collection Methods
Incorporating evidence that directly pertains to the Russian military establishment
promises to enhance the reliability of my findings. The most valuable primary data sources are
Russian military journals that include scholarship published by high-ranking military officials.
Military Thought (Voennaia Mysl’) and Military Industrial Courier (Voyenno Promyshlennyy
Kuryer) are unique sources on the development of Russian military theory. They both offer
articles on Russian military reform, tactics and strategy of modern combat, and counterterrorism
and security operations. Other important sources for determining the scope of Russian strategic
imperatives include national military doctrines approved by the Russian President (Vladimir
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Putin) and public statements issued by military personnel and policymakers. Secondary materials
published by credible sources, such as The United States Army Special Operations Command,
will offer clarification on key concepts not properly defined in the primary documents.
Research Limitations
Acknowledging challenges and biases within this research narrows the focus of data
collection efforts and confronts assumptions about Russian military cultures. Language and the
availability of resources poses a significant barrier to the acquisition of complete information
about Russian military affairs. Ideational strain exists as well, particularly when distinguishing
between nationalist sentiment and actual substantiated claims. Since Military Thought and
Military Industrial Courier are central organs of the Russian Defense Ministry, the journals’
contributors are top military personnel and leading military scientists. These individuals occupy
one of the highest echelons in the Russian military, but defamatory statements of the United
States and Western European nations, although subdued, are present in their writing. Partiality
toward advancing the goals of the Russian military adheres to the present international political
climate, but sources published in these journals still offer a firsthand account into the
organization and strategic thinking of Russia’s military theorists.
The validity of this study comes from its willingness to explore whether presupposed
typologies of behavior, such as the maneuver-attrition-punishment scheme, can sufficiently
explain modern military strategies. A focus on technological innovation and participation outside
of military structures may demonstrate a considerable shift in the way a state deploys its armed
forces. Some scholars may call into question the objectivity of case study approaches, but this
study, backed by a well-defined research objective, employs variables of theoretical interest for
the purposes of explanation. Moreover, this study will not address all the interesting aspects of
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the Crimean Crisis, but it will provide a foundation for scholars to advance understandings of
military decision-making within this case.
IV. Data Collection and Assessment:
Introduction
The case that constitutes the analytical framework for this section is the annexation of the
Ukrainian territory of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. The salience of this particular
engagement stems from the covert nature of Russian operations on the Crimean Peninsula
coupled with the confluence of strategic foresight and advanced technologies. Russia’s assertive
promotion of its national interests, punctuated by its military actions in Crimea, demonstrates a
more confident and somewhat less risk-averse Kremlin, but it also has revived international
concerns about the re-emergence of a more militaristic Russia. Scrutinizing the strategic
initiatives of the Russian military through the lens of the 2014 Crimean Crisis will provide a
more perspicuous explanation of how states develop comprehensive military doctrines.
To successfully gain insight into my conceptual question, I evaluate two independent
variables, derived from the literature, that hypothetically influence a state’s military strategy.
These include civil-military relations and internal learning experiences. The first variable
concerns the balance of power between civilian apparatuses of government and military
leadership. If the military, as an institutional entity, shares or gains flexible control over its
internal affairs from the legally established arrangement between legislative and executive
branches of government, then its policy preferences will be more pronounced. Resulting strategic
initiatives will promote the military’s organizational interests and reflect hawkish stances on the
inevitability of war.55 The second variable considers the processes by which the military
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formulates and adapts strategies to suit modern iterations of armed conflict. To reduce
uncertainty about appropriate doctrinal decisions, military planners evaluate internal and
vicarious experiences. More specifically, they examine conflicts in which their state participated
directly, and those involving allied and rivaling nations. The lessons drawn from these incidents
highlight the successes and failures of previous engagements and chart a new direction for
military strategic thinking.56 Overall, testing these variables with relevant data will help elucidate
the intricate processes of creating and executing state policy on the shape and use of military
force.
Case Background: The use of Military Force Towards Ukraine in 2014
An impetus for the conflict in Crimea was Russia’s insecurity and dissatisfaction with the
post-Cold War European security order. The westward orientation of neighboring Ukraine and
the prospect of its integration into the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), intergovernmental organizations not controlled by Russia, antagonized
the Kremlin and posed a threat to Russian military and economic security. When popular
demonstrations mounted towards President Yanukovych in January and February 2014, fueled
by his heavy-handed management of protesters during Euromaidan, Moscow perceived the
incident as an ongoing anti-Russian coup d’état orchestrated by Western intelligence services.57
A.S. Brychkov and A.G. Nikonorov, researchers at the Academy of Military Science, accuse the
United States of acting as the principal instigator and financier “of reformatting the global
geopolitical map.” They believe that the U.S. Congress decides which foreign governments to
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alter, and special offices within the U.S. Department of State stage and manage “democratic
revolutions” in the selected country. To avoid the spread of transformative social action in
Russia, Brychkov and Nikonorov argue, the government must conduct well-measured internal
and external policies.58 In light of these circumstances, Russia responded swiftly and decidedly
towards this challenge to security interests, making full use of the chaotic situation in Ukraine
and Russian military, diplomatic and informational superiority.
Russian information warfare (use of cyberwarfare, propaganda, and deception) was
pervasive during the intervention in Crimea as it allowed Russian forces to assume the mantle of
liberators and furnished Moscow with an acceptable premise for invasion.59 As a form of moral
suasion, information warfare targeted proxies in Crimea, preparing them for resistance against
Kiev, a separatist insurgency, and, finally, annexation by Russia.60 On the heels of Yanukovych’s
setbacks in late February, the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) dispatched several
hundred members of the 45th SPETSNAZ Regiment to Crimea. Covert operators created a
popular uprising aimed at facilitating Russia’s annexation of the region. Simultaneously GRU
agents used bribery among the ethnic Russian population to win support for the intervention.61
With tangible resistance procured, Russian hackers began conducting cyberattacks against
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Ukraine’s government, military, telecommunications, and private-sector information technology
infrastructure. They used cyberattacks to interrupt communications, obtain and leak government
documents and plans, and deface or take down public and private websites and computer
systems.62 During this phase, the Russian objective was to create the political conditions
necessary for later decisive military and paramilitary action.
The use of Russian military force in Ukraine first became discernable on February 27,
2014, when well-armed soldiers without insignia seized the building of the Crimean
parliamentary assembly. Within days, Russian Special Forces (SOF) units and elite troops
belonging to the Airborne Forces and Naval Infantry blocked entry points to Crimea as well as
Ukrainian military bases and seized military command facilities.63 Russia proceeded to bring in
regular armed forces units to reinforce its military presence on the peninsula. Military units
amassed along the Russo-Ukrainian border on February 26 when surprise inspection exercises in
the Western Military District, ordered by President Putin, involved large amounts of personnel
and equipment.64
The occupation of Crimea, supported by local and arriving Russian militias and
organized crime groups, provided control of public space and made it more difficult to identify
Russian soldiers as key players in the assault.65 A lack of clarity surrounding the crisis was
important for the initial Russian political narrative of non-involvement. President Putin
maintained that Crimean self-defense groups, not Russian soldiers, incited violence against
Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, “Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare,” prepared for Center for
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Ukrainian forces.66 The beleaguered Ukrainian military units on Crimea eventually surrendered
without fighting, and on March 16 Russian occupiers staged a referendum on the future status of
the peninsula. Two days later, on March 18, the Russian Federation illegally annexed Crimea.
Following the annexation, SOF and elite troops withdrew, and additional Russian units populated
the peninsula as the armed forces laid the foundation for a permanent military presence.
Civil-Military Relations
Having outlined the Russian use of military force towards Ukraine, I now examine the
civil-military relation aspects. The hypothesis guiding this line of inquiry assumes that states
with weak civilian control over the military are more likely to adopt maneuver strategies. Using
Stepan’s dimension of military prerogatives as a benchmark, I aim to identify areas where the
military as an institution assumes they have acquired the right to exercise effective control over
its internal governance.67 Analyzing the military’s position within a polity is crucial for
determining whether civilian apparatuses are able to dictate the strategic imperatives that
supervise the use of a state’s armed forces. In the context of the 2014 Crimean intervention, I
look for indications of any circumstances in which Russian military officials acted independently
of political authority figures.
Instances of military involvement in the formulation of state policy regarding Crimea will
indicate a high-level of decision-making authority. Following Stepan’s view presented above,
state policy dictates the scope of the use of force, such as the initiation and termination, the
escalation or de-escalation as well as the overall means for and the boundaries of a military
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operation.68 Determining the extent of direct military influence requires assessing established
legal precedents that govern military affairs. The Constitution of the Russian Federation lays out
the mechanisms of control over the use of Russia’s armed forces. Aside from vesting the Federal
Assembly (State Duma and Federation Council) with the authority to enact laws relating to war
and peace, President Putin wields significant authority over Russia’s military.69 He occupies the
position of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation70;
approves the military doctrine of the Russian Federation71; appoints and dismisses members of
the General Staff72; and approves higher military ranks.73 The composition of Putin's security
council further attests to the marginalization of military participation in the political realm. Only
one permanent member, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, is an active military officer.74
When applied to Stepan’s classificatory scheme measuring military dominance, these
findings support the proposition that there exists objective civilian control over Russia’s armed
forces. Six selected prerogatives include: constitutionally sanctioned subordination of military
institutions to the executive branch; the chief executive is de jure and de facto commander-inchief; coordination of defense sector by the chief executive and civilian political appointees;
legislative presence in handling of military affairs; intelligence agencies controlled by civilian
chains of command; and executive control over military promotions.75 Identifying apparent
deviations from objective civilian control over the military requires assessing the actors that
instigated military interference in Crimea. Any actions taken by Russian military officials
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without proper approval from political authorities would constitute a divergence from established
mechanisms of control.
The Russian military began its advance in late February 2014. The combat operation
commenced when SOF and Airborne Troops deployed to Crimea following the snapshot
exercises conducted on February 26, 2014.76 A number of treaty obligations between Russia and
Ukraine strictly forbade military maneuvers against one another. A bilateral agreement signed in
1997 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation (Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership
Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation) fixed the principle of strategic partnership, the
recognition of the inviolability of existing borders, respect for territorial integrity, and a mutual
commitment not to harm the security of each other.77 President Putin indicated that previously
negotiated agreements no longer pertained to Russia’s relationship with Ukraine because the
sitting government was illegitimate. Until President Yanukovych returned to power, Ukraine was
a rogue nation that defied established legal norms, including treaty obligations. Putin remained
adamant, however, that he would not commit Russian armed forces to Crimea.78 If the Russian
military establishment decided to violate the treaty, it would amount to a gross subversion of
civilian political authority over military affairs.
Russian military leaders have historically been suspicious of political oversight. The
decentralization of the armed forces under President Yeltsin’s leadership fueled mass corruption
and despondency. Perhaps the most glaring manifestations of the Russian officer corps' political
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activism were the frequent contestation of state policy and individual commanders' acts of direct
insubordination to their civilian and military superiors. Russia’s disastrous 1994 military
campaign in Chechnya drew the ire of military commanders who threatened to resign their posts
if politicians continued to intercede in their affairs. This frustration was particularly evident
when General Vladimir Shamanov, one of the premier Russian military commanders in
Chechnya, labeled political interference as the primary cause of the military’s impotence. 79
Characteristic of the Yeltsin era, Shamanov asserted that “there will be a powerful exodus of
officers of various ranks, including generals, from the armed forces, because the officers corps
may not survive another slap in the face.”80 Vladimir Putin’s accession to the presidency in 2000
marked a noticeable shift in the organization of Russia’s military, but internal conflicts persisted.
Putin targeted the misappropriation of state funds through illicit commercial activities in an
address to the top brass of the armed forces. He claimed that military vehicles were used illegally
to transport commercial freight, commanders were hiring soldiers out for jobs unconnected to the
requirements of military service, and private shops opened on the territory of military
installations were selling government property for profit.81 These findings show that Russian
military officials have a history of circumventing political authority to achieve their own ends.
Determining causality between the insubordination of military officials and the Crimean
intervention requires assessing the extent to which President Putin dictated the use of military
forces.
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Supporting evidence for weak civilian oversight holds that President Putin had no
mandate prior to March 1, 2014 to order a military attack on Ukrainian forces and administrative
facilities in Crimea. Constitutional provisions delegate to the Federal Assembly decision-making
power over issues relating to peace and war. However, the Federation Council issued a standing
mandate in 2009 that grants President Putin the power to deploy Russia’s armed forces in two
specific situations. First, he may use the military to repel an armed attack against Russian forces
based abroad.82 The absence of Russian troops in Ukraine prior to 2014 renders this stipulation
invalid for the purposes of instigating conflict. The second situation, however, has more merit in
the context of Russia’s incursion into Crimea. Putin may use the military to protect Russian
citizens beyond the territorial boundaries of the Russian Federation.83 Census data collected by
the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine in 2001 shows that 58 percent of Crimean residents
identified Russian as their primary language.84 While these residents were not legal citizens of
the Russian Federation, strong ethnic ties served as a pretext for the deployment of Russian
troops. Putin commented after the annexation process that “the essential issue is how to ensure
the legitimate rights and interests of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the southeast of
Ukraine.”85 The mandate issued by the Federal Assembly on March 1, 2014 gave the green light
for an invasion of Crimea, highlighting the need to introduce troops “until the socio-political
situation was normalized.”86 Putin’s insistence on legitimizing Russian presence in Crimea
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coupled with the existence of the 2009 mandate lends credibility to the counterpoint that he
ordered the deployment of Russian military forces. The actions of the military leadership
stemmed not from their own self-interests, but rather from the appointed supreme commander of
the armed forces.
The notion that the military acted on the orders of President Putin receives support from
an array of anecdotal and primary evidence. During a ring-in session broadcasted on Russian
state media in 2014, Putin acknowledged that the ‘polite people’ present in Crimea were indeed
Russian forces operating under the aegis of humanitarian intervention. He emphasized the need
to cooperate with Crimean self-defense forces to demilitarize the Peninsula and ensure the
peoples’ expression of their free will.87 Moreover, on the anniversary of Crimea’s accession to
the Russian Federation, Putin issued Executive Order #103 proclaiming February 27 to be
Special Forces Day.88 Openly confessing to the presence of Russian troops in Crimea supports
the premise that Putin dictated the strategic imperatives of military operations. The clandestine
nature of the conflict, as demonstrated by the use of special forces and other mobile units, also
aligns with the state military doctrines approved by Putin.
Versions of the state military doctrine enacted in 2010 and 2014 explicitly state that the
President of the Russian Federation determines the main priorities of military policy.89 One
commonality between both documents is that they describe the features of modern military
conflicts with exceptional precision. More specifically, they claim that the possession of the
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strategic initiative is dependent on speed, selectivity, a high level of target destruction, and
rapidity in maneuvering troops. The preservation of sustainable military command and control
systems requires securing supremacy on land, at sea, and in the air.90 The provisions contained
within these doctrines translate well into Russia’s operational movements prior to and
concurrently with the Crimean intervention. Table 1.1 details Russian military capabilities in the
operational zones bordering Ukraine (Western and Southern MDs). One discernable trend in the
data is that highly mobilized units comprised 71 percent of Russian forces in the region.91 The
posture of these troops is conducive for a maneuver strategy because exploiting critical
vulnerabilities in an enemy’s force structure requires a relative speed of movement and superior
strength.
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Surprise military inspections conducted along the Ukrainian border (Western MD) on
February 26, 2014 showcased a considerable increase in Russian military capabilities with
150,000 servicemen, 90 aircraft, 120 helicopters, 880 tanks, 1,200 pieces of equipment, and 80
naval vessels participating in combat readiness exercises.92 When evaluated holistically, three
prominent conclusions emerge from these observations. The first is that Putin ordered and
oversaw military mobilization efforts. A report issued by the Russian Defense Ministry in 2014
stated that Putin inspected the combat readiness of Russian forces that participated in the training
activities.93 Second, the military exercises involved all three principal service branches: army,
navy, and air force. The utilization of all three branches reinforces their function as decisive
factors in achieving military objectives. Mobilization training of the armed forces aims to protect
the state and the population in wartime.94 Third, there were significant formations of special
forces and airborne units located near the Ukrainian border. The preparation of these units for
combat scenarios may serve as an indication of their effectiveness during subsequent operations
in Crimea. On balance, the Russian military was well equipped and well versed with the core
facets of maneuver strategies (speed and mobility) to successfully engage foreign combatants.
The results of this data assessment do not support the premise of the first hypothesis that
states with weak civilian control over the military are more likely to adopt maneuver strategies.
Conversely, the evidence shows that strong civilian control does not necessarily lead to defensive
or restrained military strategies. President Putin dictated the direction and scope of Russian
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military strategy through established instruments of control. Constitutional provisions name
Putin Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Russia’s armed forces and grant him the authority to
oversee military affairs in their entirety. Despite past displays of frustration-induced aggression
by military officials, there is no indication of Putin’s subordinates flouting his orders during
operations in Crimea. Rather, Putin’s acknowledgment of Russian troops on the peninsula and
his supervision of military exercises conducted before the intervention suggests that he played a
paramount role in conceiving the operation. As a corollary to strict political oversight, the pursuit
of highly mobilized forces, as expressed in state-issued military doctrines and observed in
intelligence reports, classifies Russia’s strategic initiatives in the maneuver category. Therefore,
the evidence proposes that this is a case in which a state exhibiting strong civilian control over
the military makes a maneuver strategy more likely. The presidential administration in Russia,
sanctioned by popular vote, subsumed the parochial interests of the military establishment.
Strategies, such as maneuver, which typically emphasize tangible military power and
antagonistic tendencies can originate from civilian rather than military apparatuses of power.
Internal Learning Processes
The second line of inquiry focuses on the interrelation of strategic initiatives and past
combat experiences. The hypothesis guiding the assessment of data sources assumes that states
are more likely to adopt strategies that were used successfully in recent wars in which they
participated, and less likely to adopt untried strategies. Russell Leng provides a useful
framework for understanding how states incorporate lessons into strategy. He proposes that in
strategy formulation, experiential learning focuses on the outcome of a preceding crisis. States
will take stock of successful practices and model future strategies accordingly.95 Conversely,
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states may interpret lessons with a realpolitik orientation that stresses the importance of a
credible demonstration of power and resolve. This is not to say that a bold directive leads to
unbound belligerency. Leng assumes that prudence restrains state military activities—that is, a
careful calculation of the adversary’s power and the costs and risks relative to the interests at
stake.96 In the context of the 2014 Crimean intervention, I will examine publications from
Russian military theorists and compare their positions to previous military engagements, namely
the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. The existence of parallel movements may indicate the integration
of lessons into strategy development.
In Russian government and academic circles, an evolving lexicon of terms and concepts
dictates contemporary understandings of waging war. Military art is the theory and practice of
preparing and conducting armed struggle on land, in the sea, and in the circumterrestrial space.
Military art encompasses the basics of organizing, conducting, and comprehensively supporting
all modern operations and combat actions.97 At present, military science constitutes a system of
knowledge about the strategic nature and regularities of war, preparation of the state for the
latter, the development of armed forces, and methods of armed struggle. Military science is a
system of theoretical knowledge about war. Military art, meanwhile, is an area of theoretical and
practical activity implying the ability to apply this knowledge creatively depending on the
specific conditions of the situation.98 In addition to gauging the current threat environment,
Russian theorists rely on future projections of related junctural sciences and disciplines to
determine necessary adjustments to strategy.
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Integral to Russian conceptualizations of the theory and practice of war is the usage of
foresight. In a military setting, foresight is the process of cognition regarding possible changes in
military affairs and determining the perspectives of its future development. The basis of the
science of foresight is knowledge about the objective laws of war, the dialectical-materialist
analysis of events transpiring in a given historical context.99 Developing a scientific and
methodological apparatus for decision-making that considers the multifarious character of
military operations has significant implications for interpreting Russian actions in Crimea. If
strategy is continually developing alongside the basics of planning and conducting war, then
specific requirements and recommendations stem from previous military engagements. A
systematic evaluation of publications submitted by Russian military theoreticians demonstrates
the pervasiveness of concrete scientific approaches to the changing nature of military strategy.
One overarching theme among Russian military publications and practical applications is
the primacy of nonmilitary means for achieving strategic goals. General Valery Gerasimov,
Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, authored an article in 2013 that postulates a
new model for conflict development. Modern war, Gerasimov argues, focuses on intelligence
and domination of cyberspace. Information technologies have reduced the spatial, temporal, and
informational gap between the military and governmental bodies.100 The prioritization of the
informational sphere dates to Russian military operations during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.
Despite only lasting for several days, the conflict bore witness to the first successful employment
of wide-scale offensive cyber operations by Russian hacker groups.101 The involvement of the
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Russian government remains inconclusive, although the timing of the attacks and forensic
evidence provided a strong indication that the Kremlin was orchestrating the assault. For
example, as Russian military forces moved into South Ossetia, a slew of distributed denial of
service attacks (DDoS) took down Georgia’s information infrastructure, cutting off government
communications and defacing government websites. Georgian banks, transportation companies,
and private telecommunication providers were also attacked, disrupting services.102
The success of Russian covert cyber operations in Georgia set a precedent for future
strategic developments. Documents published before the 2014 Crimean intervention emphasize
the need for the Russian military to counteract new information threats and challenges.103 A
version of the Russian state military doctrine approved in 2010 calls for the creation of basic
information management systems, and their integration with existing command and control
organs at the strategic level. According to the doctrine, one of the features of modern military
conflicts is “the prior implementation of measures of information warfare in order to achieve
political objectives without the utilization of military force and, subsequently, in the interest of
shaping a favorable response from the world community to the utilization of military force.”104
By implication, the tools of information warfare can be brought to bear before the onset of
military operations to achieve the state’s objectives without a forceful response. Furthermore,
should force be required, information warfare can disorient and demoralize an adversary and
ensure that the state is able to justify its actions in the eyes of the public.
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The idea of waging war in the informational space gained widespread attention among
Russian military theoreticians and its significance to characterizations of military strategy
increased. Col. S.G. Chekinov and Lt. Gen. S.A. Bogdanov, leading experts on new-generation
warfare, state succinctly that no goal will be achieved in future wars unless one belligerent gains
information superiority over the other. Formerly fought in a three-dimensional environment,
armed struggle has expanded from ground, sea, and aerospace into an entirely new arena—
information.105 Not all theoreticians agree that the cyber component of information warfare fits
squarely with current force posturing. Lt. Gen. V.I. Kuznetsov, Col. Yu.Ye. Donskov, and Lt.
Col. O.G. Nikitin assert that developments in “cyber-engagements” confuse command and
control structures. Each tier of leadership (“commanders and staffs of brigades and battalions,
company commanders and their deputies, platoon and section (crew) leaders”) require a
proportional part of cyberspace to operate within. Once the appropriate “battlespace” (area of
responsibility) works out, commanders can effectively utilize cyberattacks to disrupt an
adversary’s combat assignments.106 The diffusion of knowledge relating to information warfare
highlights its role as a reference point for understanding emerging trends in strategy
development. Conflicts exist relating to the incorporation of specific subcomponents, such as
offensive cyberwarfare, but theorists agree that the informational sphere presents a new arena for
engaging hostiles. Russian sources also show that the process of operationalizing information
technologies relies on the experiences of outside actors, particularly the United States.
The notion that Russian military strategy advances vicariously through the experiences of
other nations receives support from a plethora of primary documents. Russian theoreticians
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identify the United States’ defense of the monopolar world system as a starting point for this vein
of strategic thinking. During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, American forces used an “electronic
knockdown” to stymie the offensive capabilities of the Iraqi Army. The electronic operation was
launched simultaneously with aerial attacks by the air force and sea-based cruise missiles,
reinforced with reconnaissance strike aircraft and artillery barrages.107 By drawing on an analysis
of armed conflicts and local wars fought in the past few decades, Maj. Gen. S.L. Pechurov
considers the Gulf War to be the first engagement of the high-tech age. Introducing the latest
information technologies to develop modern weaponry has significantly altered the patterns of
manpower employment and the conduct of military operations.108 American generals utilized
“long-range high-precision weapons, and modern reconnaissance and communication
capabilities” to defeat the Iraqis quickly and at low cost to human life.109 Chekinov and
Bogdanov contend that precision-based operations obviated the need to amass forces along the
front lines as coalition forces struck regularly and selectively at enemy targets from considerable
distances.110 These observations highlight the importance of supplementing conventional force
applications with improved information technologies. However, American actions have also
imparted to Russian military theoreticians the importance of obtaining information superiority
beyond cyberspace.
Another discernable trend in Russian strategic thought is that new-generation conflicts,
conceptualized through American participation in the 1991 Gulf War and Operation Iraqi
Freedom, will seek to depress an opponent’s armed forces personnel and population morally and
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psychologically. Analogous to American machinations of “electronic knockdowns” is the
utilization of network-centric warfare during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. American military
planners disabled elements of the Iraqi air defense system, control posts, communication centers,
radar stations, and anti-aircraft missile batteries.111 In addition to rendering the Iraqi Army
powerless to resist military advances, U.S. forces began to effect geopolitical changes. The
installment of political opposition through state propaganda, the internet, and nongovernmental
organizations ensured the protection of long-term national interests relating to energy carriers.
Furthermore, under the guise of democratization, U.S. forces assumed a peacekeeping role that
solidified their hold over the direction of Iraq’s political system.112 For Gerasimov, the task of a
peacekeeping force is to “disengage conflicting sides, protect and save the civilian population,
cooperate in reducing potential violence, and reestablish peaceful life.” With the proper amount
of preparation, peacekeepers can pacify a country with supportive measures aimed at alleviating
humanitarian costs.113 Lessons from American involvement in Iraq demonstrate that managing
territorial acquisitions and legally enforcing the presence of the invader requires establishing
favorable public opinion across multiple mediums. Non-contact methods, such as instilling
political dissent, separatism, or deescalating conflict through specialized NGOs and
peacekeeping, can be employed offensively or defensively to achieve dominance.
The practice of modern war over the last few decades has shown Russian military
theoreticians that successful and uninterrupted logistical support of troop groupings is reliant on
domination of the information space. In fact, Chekinov and Bogdanov urge their counterparts to
“without delay” start researching the use of nonmilitary measures of confrontation in wars and
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other armed conflicts.114 The integration of information superiority into Russian military strategy
during the 2014 Crimean intervention exemplifies a willingness to deceive Ukrainian forces in
the cyber domain and delude their population centers. An emphasis on remotely employing
Russian forces using non-contact methods is a product of thorough investigations into the
strategic initiatives used during previous military conflicts involving Russia, and those of other
nations. The following section attempts to evaluate these lessons in light of Russian military
activities in Crimea.
Russia appears to have used covert cyber activities in coordination with other information
tools and military operations to create a general air of uncertainty regarding the Ukrainian
government’s ability to secure its information systems. Through the cyber campaign, Russia has
quietly and persistently compromised the Ukrainian government and military’s ability to
communicate and operate, thereby undermining the legitimacy and authority of Ukrainian
political and military institutions.115 Russian hackers have utilized spear phishing, malware,
DDoS attacks, telephone denial of service attacks (TDoS), and other forms of cyber disruption
and espionage to conduct a steady drumbeat of cyberattacks targeting Ukraine’s government,
military, and telecommunications infrastructure in Crimea.116 Unlike the concurrent digital
attacks and military border crossings in Georgia, cyberattacks against Crimea disabled major
Ukrainian websites and jammed mobile phones of key Ukrainian officials before Russian forces
entered the peninsula.117 Cyber espionage before, during, and after Crimea’s annexation also
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leveraged information that could support short-term and long-term objectives, a tactic that had
not transpired, was not reported or went unnoticed against Georgia.
Reconstructions of information sabotage provided by private security firms describe the
attacks against Crimea as being particularly sophisticated. According to one security company,
cyber espionage operations employed simultaneously with other methods of information
collection appeared to accelerate battlefield tactics. Hackers targeted the computers and networks
of journalists in Ukraine as well as Ukrainian, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and
European Union (EU) officials.118 Exploiting such targets could have provided Russia with
insight into opposing journalistic narratives and advanced knowledge of important diplomatic
initiatives. Operation Armageddon, for example, began targeting Ukrainian government, law
enforcement, and military officials in mid-2013—just as active negotiations commenced for an
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, which Russia publicly deemed a national security threat.119
While there is no evidence of collusion or direction on behalf of the Russian government, the
attacks did lend to the overall confusion of the crisis, and might be reflective of the Russian
military embracing General Valery Gerasimov’s strategy on the future of warfare—conflicts will
retain an information aspect part of larger asymmetric possibilities for reducing the fighting
potential of the enemy.120 The use of an information-psychological model marks another contrast
from Russian operations in Georgia and a noticeable deepening in strategic thought surrounding
information warfare.
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Unlike Russia’s forceful invasion of Georgia, the contest over Crimea was more of an
infiltration. In the absence of a direct threat, Russia relied on non-kinetic options such as
propaganda, disinformation, denial, and deception to influence internal, regional, and global
audiences. A noticeable improvement from its efforts in Georgia, Russia used television
broadcasts to generate support for actions in Crimea and to bolster the theme of Moscow’s
necessary intervention to protect native Russian speakers.121 Additionally, pro-Russian online
media mimicked anti-Russian news sources to influence opinion; for example, the website
Ukrayinska Pravda was a pro-Russian version of the popular and generally pro-Ukrainian news
site Ukrains’ka Pravda. The pro-Russian sources would communicate false narratives about
actual events, such as denying the presence of the Russian military in Crimea or blaming the
West for conducting extensive informational warfare against Russia.122 By adapting denial and
deception strategies, outside interlopers remained confused during the military phase of the
Crimean crisis. Denying involvement in the attacks until the later stages of conflict allowed
Russia to continue messaging its desire to de-escalate the crisis while increasing chaos. Since the
United States, NATO, and the European Union could not predict Russia’s objectives, Russia
could leverage reflexive control to operate within Western decision-making loops, to reduce the
costs of its actions against Ukraine, and to keep the United States and its allies out of the
conflict.123 With the testing of the second hypothesis completed, the following section provides a
summation of the data and its implications for understanding military strategy development.
The results of this data assessment are generally supportive of the second hypothesis. The
first proposition that states are likely to adopt tried strategies is shown to be true on account of
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the similar cyber practices used during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and the 2014 Crimean
intervention. Both conflict episodes featured distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), and
the explicit targeting of government operated information networks. Widespread discussion
among Russian military theoreticians and logistical planners about the importance of
implementing information warfare into existing strategic initiatives demonstrates its prevalence
in academic and practical settings.
On balance, information warfare aligns with two guiding principles in the Russian
military. First, the Russian General Staff uses foresight to develop the theory and practice of
future war. An assemblage of nonmilitary methods, such as offensive cyber operations and the
installment of political opposition through state propaganda, the internet, social media, and
nongovernmental organizations, serve as appropriate measures for bolstering traditional forms of
military interference.124 Second, the role of mobile, mixed-type groups of forces, acting in a
single intelligence-information space is an established method of engaging adversaries in combat
situations. A strategic information standoff is important for disorganizing military and state
governance, and systems of military aerospace defense, deluding the adversary, creating the
desired public opinion, organizing anti-government demonstrations and conducting other events
aimed at reducing the opposing side’s determination to resist.125 However, the second
proposition that states are unwilling to adopt untried strategies incurs resistance when measured
against the data.
Evidence shows that Russian military officials emulate successful strategies used by
other states. Drawing lessons from U.S. military operations during the Gulf War and the 2003
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invasion of Iraq, and focusing attention on shaping reconstruction efforts, demonstrates the
importance of viewing external military activities. Defeating the enemy’s main forces and
destroying the economic potential of the opposing nation constitute the principal objectives of a
new-generation war fought in a network-centric environment.126 The overwhelming success of
U.S. military strategic imperatives in these conflicts suggested to Russian theoreticians that the
full range of military, economic, political, and diplomatic measures, blended with effective
psychological information activities, may be used to conceal preparations for an attack and the
nature of impending operations.127 Therefore, this is a case in which a state evaluates tried and
untried strategies from its own successful experiences in war and those of other states to
formulate its existing military strategies. The findings presented in this section point to the larger
conclusion that a complete understanding of states’ foreign policies must account for their
historical and vicarious learning experiences.
V. Omitted Variable:
Exogenous Pressures
The absence of a formal alliance between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the eve
of the 2014 Crimean intervention renders the testing of a related hypothesis infeasible. However,
the formation of alliance structures and their resulting impact on strategy development has
significant implications within the literature. Given the importance of military strategy for the
outcome of wars, alliances thus seem to be a likely candidate for coordinating the national
military strategies of member states, and in particular provide a potentially valuable opportunity
for more powerful states to disseminate their preferred practices to smaller allies. The
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institutional design of an alliance is an overriding factor in the overall success of coordination.
While far from foolproof, institutional mechanisms can help assuage some of the grievances
present in an alliance by creating a venue where members can voice and manage their concerns
as well as provide more predictable routines for their interaction. Questions to consider are
whether defining alliances in strict terms captures the full extent of state relations, and if
informal alliances create affinities that compel forceful action.
A convergence of ideals and practices facilitated by alliances has significant influence
over a state’s military strategy in the literature. The dominant strand of research views alliances
as tools for aggregating capabilities against a threat; nations form alliances to increase their
security by massing capabilities against a common enemy. The need for the alliance ends when
the threat passes. Conversely, other scholars examine the interdependencies formed through
military alliances and different institutional designs. Both the degree of institutionalization and
capability aggregation, identified as primary external factors, challenge the notion that states
make military doctrinal decisions independently from one another.
To understand the logic of military alliances, scholars posit several theories that explain
national choices to form and to break them. Altfeld presents a rational choice theory of military
alliances that emphasizes the trade-off between increased security (a state’s ability to maintain
the current resolution of the issues that it wishes to preserve) and decreased autonomy (the
degree to which a state pursues desired changes in the status quo).128 Morrow broadens Altfeld’s
concept of autonomy to create the possibility of autonomy gains from alliances.129 Finally,
Morrow provides an autonomy-security trade-off model that explains both symmetric (where
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both allies receive security and autonomy benefits) and asymmetric (where one ally gains
security and the other autonomy) alliances and the conditions under which each type occurs.130
One commonality between both alliance types is that a state’s security varies with the
capabilities it possesses to defend its interests. However, whereas symmetrical alliances require
great harmony of interest, asymmetrical alliances allow member states to receive security
benefits, particularly in weak areas.131 For example, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance of 1899 (the
Windsor Treaty) stopped arms shipments to the Boers through Delagoa Bay in Mozambique.
Because the cessation of shipments assisted the British in their goal of establishing control over
the Transvaal and Orange Free State (i.e., a change in the status quo), Britain gained autonomy
from the treaty. The Portuguese in return received security guarantees of their colonies in
Africa.132 All three theories show that alliances require a critical choice between conflicting
goals of security and autonomy. The pursuit of one exacts sacrifices on the other. Credible
commitments require a careful matching of interests between allies; however, those interests
need not be identical, just complimentary.
The variables most commonly used to measure shifts in military capabilities include total
military expenditures, military personnel, total population, urban population, iron and steel
production, and energy consumption.133 While security and autonomy benefits are what a state
can expect to gain from an alliance, the motivations for a state to break an alliance are a
deterioration of its security or autonomy in an alliance; an improvement in its security and
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autonomy out of an alliance; or a shift in the nation’s utility function. Any decline in a state’s
capabilities relative to its position before joining the alliance make withdrawal more attractive
than continued participation.134
The literature has also pointed out the need to distinguish between the demands of major
and minor powers. States prefer alliances that equalize the mix of autonomy and security to an
unaligned state with an unbalanced combination of the two. Minor powers have low levels of
security and high levels of autonomy and so try to form alliances that increase security at the cost
of some autonomy. The situation is different for major powers. They possess high levels of both
autonomy and security. They have no overriding interest to raise either autonomy or security;
some desire to enhance their security, while others are content with theirs. As a group, major
powers will not be driven to pursue exclusively autonomy or security in their alliances.135
The application of these variables to strategy selection demonstrates the importance of
analyzing military behavior among states. Morrow finds that asymmetric alliances are more
likely to display deeper levels of coordination and information sharing because differing goals
(greater security versus greater autonomy benefits) are neutralized through a formal
agreement.136 Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros affirm these findings but add another dimension by
demonstrating how the dissemination of internal information about military equipment,
technology, and base facilities mitigates crises among member states. Providing information
symmetries encourages efficient bargaining and the creation of unified goals and strategies. 137
The literature shows that states are inclined to form alliances to increase their security by
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massing their capabilities against a common enemy. However, there is another line of inquiry
that aims to determine how the characteristics of an alliance affect military decision-making.
The degree of institutionalization dictates the formation of military alliances. While some
alliances involve little initial investment or joint planning, others involve significant peacetime
costs in establishing formal structures and engaging in military coordination. Several scholars
have addressed the reasons sates are willing to pay these governance costs in establishing
cooperation-through controlling risks of opportunism and coordinating policy more extensively,
state leaders may be able to achieve higher benefits from cooperation.138 What has received less
empirical attention, however, is the comparative performance of less institutionalized and highly
institutionalized alliances. The question guiding researchers in this area is whether alliances that
represent “deeper” levels of cooperation have more influence over a state’s military strategy than
their less institutionalized counterparts.
Leeds and Anac propose a classification system that attempts to measure various facets of
an alliance’s level of institutionalization.139 This conceptual framework considers information on
provisions included in formal alliance agreements. The three provisions indicative of the highest
levels of joint preparation include: integrated military command during both peacetime and
wartime; common defense policies, such as integrated military plans, training, and weapons
procurement; and joint troop placements and mutual exchange of bases.140 Studies incorporating
this framework into their analyses establish specific criteria for distinguishing between the levels
of institutionalization in an alliance. Wallace, for example, considers an alliance to be highly
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institutionalized if the agreement contains any of the provisions identified by Lends and Anac.
An alliance exhibits mid-level institutionalization if it provides for any of the following more
moderate arrangements: peacetime contact among military officials; the creation of any formal
intergovernmental military organization; provision of military training or technology; and
specific plans for contribution levels in the event of conflict.141
Focusing on variation in the design of alliances challenges a good deal of existing work,
which assumes alliances organize and operate in essentially the same manner.142 By not
considering the ways in which alliances may differ, it is perhaps not surprising that several recent
studies fail to find a consistent effect for alliances on a range of national policies.143 Through
various mechanisms of coercion and persuasion, highly institutionalized alliances appear to have
the potential to act as devices for spreading military practices and coordinating the national
strategies of member states around the leadership of more powerful states. Less institutionalized
alliances lack adequate levels of interaction to overcome issues of uncertainty and effectively
transfer knowledge and practices necessary for adopting parent strategies.144 Implicit in the
literature is that alliance structures should be considered as closely as domestic institutions when
studying military strategy. Moreover, studies show that minor powers, despite possessing high
levels of autonomy, are less likely to make strategy choices in the absence of external influences.
VI. Conclusion:
Framing strategy development through the lens of the 2014 Crimean crisis sheds light on
a few larger theoretical concerns. Findings from the first hypothesis have important implications
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for understanding the relationship between government and military functionaries. Under the
leadership of Vladimir Putin, the executive branch enjoys virtually unbridled political authority
to initiate policy and enforce its implementation without any authentic legislative or judicial
opposition.145 The lack of institutional constraints poses the question as to whether the scholarly
community must distinguish between civilian control and presidential oversight. Traditional
notions of civil-military relations hold that states with weak civilian control are more likely to
exhibit hostile military strategies.146 Regarding Crimea, however, Putin remained at the forefront
of escalation, from openly denying Russian presence to expounding the need for a military force
to safeguard indigenous peoples.147 In contrast to Yeltsin’s acquiescence to growing military
activism and open insubordination from individual commanders during the First Chechen War,
Putin elicited institutional change that effectively restored state control.148 He imposed a superpresidential system that extended his command over all facets of national policy, including
military affairs. The singular nature of Russia’s political system suggests that the orientation of
elected officials does not restrict them to a particular course of action, and high levels of
centralization do not preclude aggressive military strategies.
While strategy selection and objectives sought from war are reflective of national policies
established through a political track, the analytical concept of strategy remains apolitical. The
intricacies of strategy (scientific, methodological, and practical applications) stem from
calculated evaluations of past and present military initiatives. Theoreticians and logistical
See, The Constitution of the Russian Federation, “Chapter 4. The President of the Russian Federation.”
Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 47-50. See also Todd Sechser, “Are Soldiers Less War-Prone
Than Statesmen?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 (2004): 762-764.
147 President of Russia, “Vladimir Putin answered journalists’ questions on the situation in Ukraine,” March 4,
2014. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366. See also, President of Russia, “Direct Line with
Vladimir Putin,” April 17, 2014. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796.
148 For a detailed analysis of Yeltsin’s relations with the military consider, Zoltan Barany, “Civil-Military
Relations and Institutional Decay: Explaining Russian Military Politics.” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 4 (2008):
587-592.
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planners oversee the preparation of the armed forces for conflict and the allotment of resources
necessary to achieve victory. However, the depth and breadth of studies are not limited to
conflicts in which the state directly participated. Russian military theorists frequently addressed
American operations to better gauge the condition of their armed forces and the present combat
environment.149 Information warfare became an all-encompassing topic, and the employment of
cyberattacks during the intervention in Crimea attests to the importance of learning processes for
strategic thought. Russian publications show that states create intricate systems of knowledge to
delineate shortfalls in planning methods and determine necessary adjustments to force structures.
They also demonstrate the risks associated with assuming the relationship between strategy and
victory. Uncertainty acts as an impetus for critical review and looking to internal and external
experiences assists with reducing variability in strategy development. Overall findings also
indicate several possible avenues for further inquiry.
First, on a theoretical level, further work should deepen understandings of the political
risks of maneuver strategies, especially as they relate to civil-military relations. Additional
studies might provide a more sophisticated portrayal of the costs and benefits of maneuver.
Specifically, states undergoing democratization may be inclined to engage in warfare as the
transition process grants militaries a greater voice in the making of foreign policy, leading the
state to adopt a maneuver strategy. Concerning the general viability of an alliance-based
explanation, a more detailed examination of the functioning and relative strength of specific
institutional mechanisms requires further research. For instance, foreign bases provide a setting
for close contact between military officials from different backgrounds to share knowledge and
practices. Failure to balance these advantages against the backlash bases often create in host
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countries may hinder the home state’s overall influence.150 Examining the conditions under
which these various mechanisms are more or less likely to operate, would have the additional
benefit of contributing to the growing literature on the military and political effects of specific
provisions within alliance agreements.
On an empirical level, future work could expand on the strategic choices of states across
time as well as space, permitting an opportunity to examine when and why states change
strategies. The scope of this study is limited to one specific case, so including several additional
cases may produce more generalizable results on strategy alterations. Finally, political scientists
should collaborate with information technology specialists to better gauge the relationship
between cyber warfare and strategy. The scholarly community needs a better grasp of
information technologies; their operationalization in a military context, the transmission
networks used to attack the internet servers of the opposing side, and possible enhancements in
military security. Studies should also investigate the infrastructural requirements necessary for an
offensive cyber capability and whether the emulation of information-oriented strategies is
feasible for smaller nations with fewer material resources.
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